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PUBLIC TRUSTS IN OKLAHOMA
M. Thomas Arnold*
Professor Arnold discusses the creation, amendment, oper-
ation, funding and possible uses ofpublic trusts in Oklahoma.
He first discusses formation and amendment of a public trust
and then analyzes the operation ofpublic trusts in Oklahoma
and the various methods which may be employed to fund them.
Next, he focuses on how a public trust may own and operate a
public utility and the ability of thepublic trust to engage in busi-
ness for a public purpose. Finally, he examines the Interlocal
Cooperation Act in relation to public trusts. Professor Arnold
concludes that thepublic trust can be a useful toolfor rendering
services to the public or for developing industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oklahoma Public Trust Act provides for the creation of trusts
with the state, any county, or any municipality as beneficiary and au-
thorizes these public trusts to issue obligations and provide funds for
the furtherance of any approved purpose of their beneficiaries.' The
trustee of a public trust is "an agency of the state and the regularly
constituted authority of the beneficiary for the performance of the
functions for which the trust [is] created."2 The Local Industrial Devel-
opment Act allows "any municipality and any county to use a trust
created under [the] Public Trust Act for the purposes of securing or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; A.B., M.A., Ohio Uni-
versity; J.D., The University of Michigan Law School.
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(a) (1981). Prior to 1976, the statute permitted the formation of
a public trust with "the state, or any county, municipality, political or governmental subdivision,
or governmental agency of the state as the beneficiary." See 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 319, § 1,
pp. 588-89.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has indicated that a public trust formed pursuant to the Pub-
lic Trust Act may have multiple or successive beneficiaries. Board of County Comm'rs v. War-
ram, 285 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (Okla. 1955).
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 179 (1981).
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developing industry."3 The public trust is a legal entity separate from
its beneficiary and, thus, debts of the public trust are not obligations of
the beneficiary.4 This article will discuss a number of topics relating to
the formation, amendment, operation, funding and possible uses of
public trusts in Oklahoma.'
II. FORMATION AND AMENDMENT OF PUBLIC TRUSTS
A. Formation
A public trust may be created by written instrument or by will,6
and may be created by a private individual. The creation of a public
trust requires the express approval of the Oklahoma legislature and the
governor if the state of Oklahoma is the beneficiary.' If the beneficiary
of the trust is a county or municipality, the express approval of two-
thirds of the membership of the governing body of the beneficiary
county or municipality is required.8 A public trust becomes effective
upon acceptance of the beneficial interest therein by the governor of
Oklahoma, if the state is the beneficiary, or by the governing body of
the county or municipality which is the beneficiary.9
If the state of Oklahoma is the beneficiary, there are two addi-
tional requirements for the formation of a public trust. First, the
Oklahoma attorney general must determine that the trust is in proper
form and compatible with Oklahoma law. 10 In addition, the trustees
must adopt bylaws for the administration of the trust and submit them
in writing to the governor. The bylaws become effective only upon ap-
3. Fort v. Oklahoma Indus., Inc., 385 P.2d 470, 475 (Okla. 1963).
4. See Morris v. Oklahoma City, 299 P.2d 131, 136-37 (Okla. 1956); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Warram, 285 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (Okla. 1955).
5. In writing this article, the author has relied on the Oklahoma statutes, the available case
law, and a number of opinions of the Oklahoma attorney general. The author recognizes that
opinions of the attorney general are not binding authority. They do, however, serve as persuasive
authority on a number of questions not dealt with by the case law. Cf. Democratic Party of Okla.
v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Okla. 1982) ("Public officials act at their peril when their action is
in contravention of an opinion by the attorney general."); National Cowboy Hall of Fame and
Western Heritage Center v. State ex rel. Okla. Human Rights Comm'n, 579 P.2d 1276, 1279
(Okla. 1978) ("In analyzing the weight to be given to an Attorney General's opinion, it is to be
noted such opinions are persuasive authority.").
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 177 (1981).
7. Id § 176(a).
8. Id
9. Id § 177; cf. In re Fort Cobb, Okla., Irrigation Fuel Auth., 468 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Okla.
1979) (failure of governing body of municipality to accept beneficial interest in public trust was
fatal defect preventing creation of valid trust).
10. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 177 (1981).
1983]
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proval by the governor.I'
After the trust interest has been accepted, and if the state is the
beneficiary, the trust is approved by the attorney general, the Public
Trust Act requires that "the [trust] instrument or will, together with the
written acceptance of the beneficial interest and approval of the Attor-
ney General endorsed thereon, shall be recorded.
B. Amendment
The amendability of a public trust depends upon the terms of the
instrument creating the trust and general principles of trust law. As to
the terms of the trust agreement, the Oklahoma attorney general has
rendered an opinion that "[n]o statute gives the board of trustees of a
public trust the authority to amend the instrument by which the trust
was created."' 3  The opinion concluded that "whether such a power
resides in the trustees is in the first instance a question of fact depen-
dent upon the precise terms of the instrument of creation."' 4
As to general principles of trust law, in 1968 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court decided a case dealing with the amendment of a public
trust. 5 The court referred to the provision in the Oklahoma Trust Act
providing that "any trust may be revoked by the trustor upon the writ-
ten consent of all living persons having vested or contingent interest
therein."' 6 The court stated:
Since an alteration, amendment, revision, or modification of a
provision of an instrument creating a trust, in effect, revokes a
portion of the trust, we hold that any trust which may be re-
voked entirely in the manner provided [by the above quoted
11. Id § 176(b).
12. Id § 177. The recording is "in the office of the county clerk of each county wherein is
situated any real estate, or any interest therein, belonging to [the] trust, as well as in the county
wherein is located the trust property or wherein are conducted its principal operations." Id If the
state of Oklahoma is the beneficiary, then a certified copy of the instrument or will creating the
trust and the instrument of acceptance must be filed with the Oklahoma Secretary of State. Id
13. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-34, at 9 (Okla. 1982) (to be published at 14 Op. Att'y Gen.
(Okla. 1982)).
14. Id
15. Morrison v. Ardmore Indus. Dev. Corp., 444 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1968).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1981).
For purposes of this article it is necessary to differentiate court decisions relying on the
Oklahoma Trust Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 60 §§ 175.1-.54 (1981) in situations where the Public Trust
Act does not have an applicable provision on which the court may base its opinion as opposed to
decisions strictly relying on the provisions of the Public Trust Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 60 §§ 176-
180.4 (1981).
See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text and notes 127-130 and accompanying text for
examples of cases relying on the Oklahoma Trust Act.
[Vol. 19:192
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provision] may be altered, amended, revised, modified, re-
voked, or terminated, in part, in the same manner.17
Thus, a public trust could be amended by the trustor with the consent
of all the beneficiaries.
The amendment of a public trust with the state of Oklahoma as a
beneficiary involves an additional consideration. The Public Trust Act
provides: "No public trust in which the State of Oklahoma is the bene-
ficiary may be amended without a two-thirds (2) vote of approval of
the trustees of such trust. Provided, that any such amendment is sub-
ject to the approval of the Governor of the State of Oklahoma."' 8 Ap-
parently this provision does not authorize the amendment of public
trusts with the state as beneficiary. Instead, it merely states that if such
a public trust can be amended, then a two-thirds vote of approval of
the trustees and the approval of the governor are required. The
amendability of the trust would still depend upon the terms of the in-
strument creating the trust and general principles of trust law.
There is a likely exception to the statutory requirement of ap-
proval by two-thirds of the trustees and the governor for amendment of
a public trust whose beneficiary is the state of Oklahoma. This require-
ment was added to the Public Trust Act by an amendment in 1976.19
Prior to 1976, no special conditions were imposed upon amendment of
public trusts in which the state of Oklahoma was a beneficiary.20 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that a statute should be given pro-
spective application only unless a contrary legislative intent is ex-
pressed clearly in or necessarily implied from the language.21 It is
likely, therefore, that trusts created prior to the amendment of the Act
are not subject to the new conditions imposed by the 1976 amendment.
17. 444 P.2d at 820. Interestingly, the court did not refer to or rely on language in the Public
Trust Act which, at the time in question, provided: "Any [public] trust may be terminated by
agreement of the trustee, or if there be more than one, then all of the trustees, and the governing
body of the beneficiary, with the approval of the Governor of the State of Oklahoma .. " 1951
Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 5, p. 167. This provision was continued when the Act was amended in
1970. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 180 (1981). One may question whether this provision also gives
the named parties the power to amend the trust on the theory that an amendment, in effect, termi-
nates a portion of the trust.
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(c) (1981).
19. 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 222, § 1, p. 356.
20. See 1970 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 319, § 1, pp. 588-90, containing no language pertaining to
amendment of a public trust.
21. Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okla. 1973). See generally 13 OKLA. DIGEST Stat-
utes §§ 261-278 (West 1968 & Supp. 1983).
1983]
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III. OPERATION OF PUBLIC TRUSTS
A. Selection of Trustees
The method of selection of the trustees of a public trust depends
upon the identity of the beneficiary. If the beneficiary is the state of
Oklahoma, then the trust must have five trustees appointed by the gov-
ernor of the state of Oklahoma with the advice and consent of the
Oklahoma Senate.22 This method of selecting trustees applies to the
appointment of the initial trustees, their replacements at the end of
their terms, and vacancies created by death, resignation, or otherwise.23
This statutory requirement of appointment by the governor with
advice and consent by the senate may not apply universally. Prior to
its amendment in 1976, the Public Trust Act provided that the appoint-
ment, succession, powers, duties, term, and manner of removal of trust-
ees of public trusts was controlled by the terms of the instrument or will
creating the trust.2' This provision applied to all public trusts, includ-
ing those with the state of Oklahoma as a beneficiary. A statute is gen-
erally given prospective operation only, unless a contrary legislative
intent is expressed clearly in or necessarily implied from the language
of the statute.2 5 The current provision governing selection of trustees
of trusts with the state as a beneficiary covers "[a]ny public trust that
hereafter names the State of Oklahoma as the beneficiary ....
The use of the word "hereafter" in the statute suggests an intent that
the statute be given prospective operation only. Therefore, it seems
likely that trusts with the state as a beneficiary formed prior to the stat-
utory amendment are governed by the terms of the instrument or will
creating the trust on the question of selection of trustees.
If the beneficiary of a public trust is a county or municipality, then
the instrument or will creating the trust shall provide for the appoint-
ment, succession, terms and manner of removal of the trustees. Except
for judicial removal of a trustee for cause, these provisions of the in-
strument or will are controlling.27 Thus, greater flexibility in structur-
ing the manner of selection of trustees is possible for public trusts with
a county or municipality as the beneficiary.
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178(B) (1981).
23. Id
24. 1970 OkIa. Sess. Laws ch. 319, § 3, p. 590.
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178(B) (1981) (emphasis added).
27. Id § 178(C).
[Vol. 19:192
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B. Trustee Conflicts of Interest
The Oklahoma Constitution contains a provision making conflicts
of interest through self-dealing a felony,28 and the Oklahoma statutes
provide a penalty for a violation of this provision.2 9 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that this constitutional provision is not vio-
lated when a public official of a beneficiary government serves as a
trustee of a public trust3" because "[p]ublic officers of a beneficiary gov-
ernmental entity are contemplated as possible Trustees of public
trusts . . 3
The constitutional conflicts of interest prohibition would be appli-
cable, however, to prohibit sef-dealing by a trustee of a public trust
regardless of whether that trustee was also a public official of the bene-
ficiary government. In addition, the Public Trust Act itself includes a
prohibition against direct or indirect self-dealing by trustees. Viola-
tions of this prohibition are grounds for removal of a trustee and render
unenforceable the contract involved.32
The conflicts of interest provision in the Public Trust Act, unlike
that in the Oklahoma Constitution, purports to exempt five categories
of contracts from the self-dealing prohibition.33 The most important
exemption covers contracts secured by competitive bidding after a pub-
lic invitation to bid, provided the trust records reflect that the trustee's
interest has been fully and publicly disclosed.
The five exemptions found in the Public Trust Act apparently con-
flict with the express constitutional prohibition against self-dealing by
public officials. The Oklahoma attorney general has, for this reason,
rendered an opinion that the exemptions in the Public Trust Act violate
the Oklahoma Constitution.34
In summary, a trustee of a public trust is prohibited from direct or
indirect self-dealing by the conflicts of interest provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution and of the Public Trust Act. These provisions
28. OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 11.
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 341 (1981).
30. Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d 134, 138 (Okla. 1977); Woodward v. City of Anadarko,
351 P.2d 292, 297-98 (Okla. 1960).
31. Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d at 138. Cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178(A) (1981) ("Trust-
ees, who are public officers, shall serve without compensation, but may be reimbursed for actual
expenses incurred in the performance of their duties as trustees.").
32. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178.8 (1981).
33. Id
34. 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 243, 251 (Okla. 1980).
1983]
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do not, however, prohibit a public official of a beneficiary government
from serving as a trustee of a public trust.
C. Dual Office Holding
The Oklahoma statutes prohibit dual office holding.3" It seems
likely that this prohibition applies to trustees of public trusts. The
Oklahoma attorney general has rendered an opinion reaching this con-
clusion.36 The opinion relies in large part on an Oklahoma Supreme
Court case which described trustees of public trusts as "public of-
ficers".37 In addition, the attorney general's opinion referred to lan-
guage in the Public Trust Act stating: "The trustee, or trustees . . .
shall be an agency of the State and the regularly constituted authority of
the benejciary for the performance of the functions for which the trust
shall have been created. 38
As discussed above, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has decided
that an individual may lawfully serve as an official of a beneficiary
government and as a trustee of a public trust. The court has stated:
"Public officers of a beneficiary governmental entity are contemplated
as possible Trustees of public trusts . . . -39 However, the court, in
reaching that conclusion, did not mention the dual office prohibition.
Nor did the court discuss the question of whether a trustee of a public
trust could hold a public office other than one under the beneficiary of
the public trust.
The Oklahoma attorney general opinion, currently the only au-
thority on the question, concluded that the holding of a public office of
a beneficiary government by a public trustee does not violate the dual
office holding prohibition,40 but that the holding of any other public
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 6 (1981) (Some exceptions are the notaries public and State Text-
book Committee members).
36. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-35 (Okla. 1982) (to be published at 14 Op. Att'y Gen. - (Okla.
1982)).
37. Id at 2; see State ex tel Cartwright v. Oklahoma Indus. Auth., 629 P.2d 1244, 1250
(Okla. 1981). The court also referred to public trust trustees as "public officials." Id at 1249.
38. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-35, at 2 (Okla. 1982) (to be published at 14 Op. Att'y Gen. -
(Okla. 1982)) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 179 (1981) (emphasis in opinion); see also OKLA.
STAT. tit. 60, § 179 (1981); see also supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
39. Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d at 138; see also supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying
text.
40. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-35 (Okla. 1982) (to be published at 14 Op. Att'y Gen. - (Okla.
1982)). The facts upon which the opinion was rendered involved a trustee of a public trust with a
municipality as the beneficiary. The trustee also served as a commissioner of the municipality's
urban renewal authority. The attorney general opined that this arrangement violated the dual
office holding prohibition. Id at 9, 11; 14 Op. Att' Gen.
[Vol. 19:192
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office would violate the prohibition.4' The opinion notes that the
Oklahoma Supreme Court cases which have approved of public offi-
cials serving as trustees of public trusts involved trustees who were pub-
lic officials of the beneficiary." Thus, these cases did not sanction
service by other public officials as trustees. The opinion also recognizes
that these cases did not discuss the dual office holding prohibition.43
These cases did, however, state or imply that service as trustee by a
public official of the beneficiary government is lawful.' According to
the attorney general opinion, the arrangement could not have been le-
gal if it violated the dual office holding prohibition.45
D. Oversight of Public Trusts
The activities of a public trust are potentially subject to public
scrutiny. For example, the activities of a public trust with the state of
Oklahoma as the beneficiary are subject to monitoring by a legislative
oversight committee.46 In addition, every public trust is required to
have an annual audit of the funds, accounts, and fiscal affairs of the
trust.47 The audit must be ordered within thirty days of the close of the
trust's fiscal year.48 The audit must be done by a certified public ac-
countant, a certified municipal accountant, or a licensed public ac-
countant and must be certified with an unqualified opinion. The audit
must conform to standards set by the State Auditor and Inspector and a
copy of the audit must be filed with the State Auditor and Inspector.
Where the state of Oklahoma is a beneficiary, one copy of the audit
must be filed with the governor and one copy with the legislative over-
sight committee. Where the beneficiary is a county or municipality, a
copy of the audit must be filed with the respective beneficiary govern-
ment. All required copies must be filed within ninety days following
the close of the trust's fiscal year.49
41. Id
42. Id at 4-6; 14 Op. Att'y Gen. - The Oklahoma cases are Halstead, 566 P.2d 134; Wood-
ward, 351 P.2d 292.
43. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-35 at 4-6 (Okla. 1982) (to be published at 14 Op. Att'y Gen. -
(Okla. 1982).
44. Id at 4, 5; 14 Op. Att'y Gen. -
45. Id at 4, 14 Op. Att'y Gen.
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178.1 (1981). The Act provides for a committee of six members,
three from the Oklahoma Senate and three from the Oklahoma House. The Senate members are
appointed by the President Pro Tempore and the House members by the Speaker of the House.
Id
47. Id § 180.1.
48. Id
49. Id § 180.2(a).
19831
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Meetings of the trustees of a public trust are open to the public,
and the records of a public trust are subject to inspection by members
of the public. The Public Trust Act provides:
Meetings of trustees of all public trusts shall be open to
the public to the same extent as is required by law for other
public boards and commissions. Such meetings shall also be
open to the press and any such equipment deemed necessary
by the press to record or report the activities of the meet-
ings. . . . Records of the trust and minutes of the trust meet-
ings of any public trust shall be written and kept in a place,
the location of which shall be recorded in the office of the
county clerk of each county, wherein the trust instrument
shall be recorded."0
The Local Industrial Development Act provides that with regard to
trusts created pursuant to it:
All meetings of the trustees shall be open to the public to
the same extent as is required by law of meetings by other
boards and commissions, and all records of the trustees shall
be public records as provided by law and shall be kept either
in the office of the city clerk or the county clerk, as the case
may be.:'
Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated that the above
quoted provision of the Public Trust Act was to be liberally con-
strued. 2 The court stated that the term "records" in the Public Trust
Act included any "document, book, paper, photograph, microfilm,
sound recording, or other material, regardless of physical form or char-
acteristics, made or received in connection with a transaction of official
business." 3 In addition, it held that the records or copies thereof must
be kept in one location,5 4 and must be available for inspection during
"those hours during which persons in the community keep similar busi-
nesses open for the transaction of business. 55
50. Id § 178(D).
51. Id tit. 62, § 662.
52. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma Indus. Auth., 629 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Okla. 1981).
53. Id at 1248 (relying on OKLA. STAT. tit. 67, § 153(b), the definition of "records" for pur-
poses of the Preservation of Essential Records Act, and OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 2, which provides:
"Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined in any statute, such definition is applicable
to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs, except where a contrary intention plainly
appears.")
54. 629 P.2d at 1250.
55. Id at 1251.
[Vol. 19:192
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E. Competitive Bidding
The Public Trust Act, the Local Industrial Development Act, and
the Public Competitive Bidding Act of 1974 all have provisions dealing
with competitive bidding which may be applicable to a public trust.56
The Public Trust Act requires that "[c]ontracts for construction, labor
equipment, material or repairs in excess of Two Thousand Dollars
($2,000.00) shall be awarded by public trusts to the lowest and best
competitive bidder . . . . 5 The Public Trust Act requirement of
competitive bidding is not applicable to the contracts of industrial and
cultural trusts. In addition, contracts may be made without competitive
bidding or public notice if the trustees find that an immediate emer-
gency exists and an immediate expenditure of trust funds in excess of
two thousand dollars is necessary "in order to avoid loss of life,
substantial damage to property, or damage to the public peace or safety
" 58
Although industrial trusts are exempt from the competitive bid-
ding requirements of the Public Trust Act, the Local Industrial Devel-
opment Act provides that contracts "for the payment of Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) or more for the purchase of any materials, equip-
ment, or supplies or for the construction of facilities. . . shall be made
only. . . to the lowest and best bidder. . .-15 after public advertising.
Trusts formed under the Local Industrial Development Act would be
subject to this competitive bidding requirement.
In addition, all public trusts are subject to the Public Competitive
Bidding Act of 1974.60 That Act applies to public construction con-
tracts exceeding $7500 by public agencies6 and defines public agency
to include "any public trust."'62 In addition, the Act expressly states:
"This act shall apply to contracts made by a public trust created pursu-
ant to the Local Industrial Development Act.1' 63 Further, this Act
would be applicable to cultural trusts even though they are exempted
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 176-180.4 (1981); id tit. 62, §§ 651-64; id. tit. 61, §§ 101-36. Addi-
tionally, the provisions of both the Public Trust Act and the Local Industrial Development Act
pertaining to revenue bonds generally require the sale of bonds by competitive bidding after pub-
lic advertising. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(e) (1981); id tit. 62 § 655(c).
57. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(f) (1981).
58. Id
59. Id tit. 62, § 662.
60. Id tit. 61, §§ 101-136.
61. See id § 102(4), 103.
62. Id § 102(3).
63. Id § 127.
1983]
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from the competitive bidding requirement of the Public Trust Act.64
F. Limits on the Use of Public Trust Funds and Assets
In Oklahoma a public trust may be formed for "the furtherance
and accomplishment of any authorized and proper public function or
purpose of the state or of any county or municipality . . . with the
state, or any county or municipality as the beneficiary."65 Thus, limits
on the permissible functions and purposes of the state, counties or mu-
nicipalities may also impose limits on the allowable functions and pur-
poses of a public trust. The Oklahoma Constitution prohibits the state,
counties and municipalities from aiding sectarian or religious purposes
or institutions, or from making gifts of assets to private organizations.
These limits would also apply to public trusts with the state, a county
or a municipality as a beneficiary. The Oklahoma Constitution
provides:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or sys-
tem of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or digni-
tary, or sectarian institution as such.66
The Oklahoma attorney general has rendered an opinion that the issu-
ances of bonds by and use of the revenues of a public trust to provide
funds for a sectarian institution would violate this constitutional provi-
sion.6 7 The opinion stated:
Since it cannot be presumed that the Oklahoma Legisla-
ture acted contrary to its duty under [the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion] to give effect to the provisions of the Oklahoma
Constitution. . . it must be concluded the Legislature did not
intend, directly or indirectly, to aid sectarian institutions by
enacting the public trust statutes.68
In addition to prohibiting public aid for religious and sectarian
purposes, the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits gifts by the state, coun-
ties and municipalities to any private organization. 69 Thus, it is clear
64. See 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 642 (Okla. 1978) (cultural trust subject to Public Competitive Bid-
ding Act of 1974).
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(a) (1981).
66. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5.
67. 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 518 (Okla. 1981).
68. Id at 521 (citations omitted).
69. OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 14 provides, in part: "Taxes shall be levied and collected by
[Vol. 19:192
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that the state of Oklahoma may not make a donation of funds, or a gift
of property to a private organization without violating the Oklahoma
Constitution. This is true regardless of how worthy the purposes of the
gift and of the private organization. The state may, however, make use
of a private agency for a public purpose if such is done in a proper
manner, i.e., through a contractual arrangement. The attorney general
of Oklahoma rendered an opinion in 1972 that stated:
The cases. . . clearly indicate that "in a proper manner"
is interpreted as meaning that an appropriation can never
take the form of a gift. In order for an appropriation to be
validly made to a private agency it must not only be for a
public purpose, but it must be made in such a manner as to
insure that primary control over expenditures will always lie
in the State. The agency must be under a contractual obliga-
tion to perform the requisite contractual provisions as stipu-
lated by the State in a manner designated and approved by
the State. The agency's activities, expenditures, and proce-
dures must be conducted in such a manner as to insure State
supervision and the State must retain the power to terminate
its relationship with the private agency if it determines that
the private agency has not satisfactorily fulfilled its
obligations.70
The principles of law regarding receipt of funds by private organi-
zations from local governments are similar to these pertaining to re-
ceipt of state funds. Gifts are prohibited. The Oklahoma attorney
general rendered an opinion in 1980 that the Oklahoma Constitution
prohibits not only direct use of municipal funds for the benefit of a
private group, but also indirect expenditures through the use of munici-
pal labor and equipment to make improvement on property owned by
a church, nonprofit corporation or other private entity solely for the
benefit of the owner of the property.7'
Even though gifts or donations by local governments are prohib-
ited by the Oklahoma Constitution, local governmental funds can be
general laws, and for public purposes only. ... In addition, article X, § 15 provides, in part:
"nor shall the State become an owner or stockholder in, nor make donation by gift, subscription
. .to stock, by tax, or otherwise, to any company, association, or corporation." Finally, article
X, § 17 provides: "The Legislature shall not authorize any county or subdivision thereof, city,
town, or incorporated district, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corpora-
tion, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to loan its credit to any corpora-
tion, association, or individual."
70. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 237, 239 (Okla. 1972).
71. 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 75, 77-78 (Okla. 1980).
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lawfully expended pursuant to a contractual arrangement with a pri-
vate agency in furtherance of a public purpose. The attorney general of
Oklahoma has rendered an opinion that Federal Revenue Sharing
funds of the city of Lawton could not be directly appropriated to a
nonprofit charitable corporation. 2 The opinion stated, however, that
the funds could be expended by means of a contractual arrangement
made with the nonprofit corporation in furtherance of a public pur-
pose.73 The opinion relied partially on the provision in the Oklahoma
statutes permitting a city "to make all contracts and do all other acts in
relation to the property and affairs of the city, necessary to the good
government of the city, and to the exercise of its corporate and admin-
istrative powers."74
It is significant that a similar statutory provision pertaining to
counties exists. It provides:
Each organized county within the State shall be a body
corporate and politic and as such shall be empowered for the
following purposes:
4. To make all contracts and do all other acts in relation to
the property and concerns of the county necessary to the exer-
cise of corporate or administrative power.71
In addition, the Oklahoma attorney general has rendered an opinion
which states that "[t]here is no question that a direct appropriation by
the county excise board to a private corporation is prohibited by the
[Oklahoma] Constitution. ' 76 However, the opinion went on to state
that "nothing in [the constitutional prohibition] precludes a county
from acquiring services from a private entity for the benefit of the aged,
infirm or unfortunate inhabitants of the county on a contract basis. 77
The principles applicable to the receipt by a private entity of state
and local governmental funds are probably also applicable to the re-
ceipt of funds or other property from a public trust. The Oklahoma
attorney general has rendered an opinion stating that a public trust or-
ganized to function as a municipal water utility could not lawfully do-
72. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 196, 197 (Okla. 1977).
73. Id at 198.
74. Id at 197 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 11 § 568 (1971) (repealed 1977)). The current provision
can be found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-101(4) (1981).
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 1(4) (1981).
76. 9 Op. Att'y Gen. 332, 332 (Okla. 1976).
77. Id at 333 (emphasis added).
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nate water to a charitable organization.78 The opinion reasoned that if
the public trust were state in nature, then the constitutional provision
prohibiting gifts of funds or property by the state to private organiza-
tions would be applicable; if municipal in nature, the constitutional
prohibition of gifts by municipalities would be applicable. Either way,
the result would be the same.79
In summary, public trusts are prohibited from aiding sectarian or
religious purposes or institutions, and from making gifts of trust prop-
erty or funds to private organizations.
IV. FUNDING OF PUBLIC TRUSTS
A. Power to Borrow and Give Security
A public trust may be granted the power by the trust instrument to
borrow money, issue obligations and secure such obligations through
pledge or mortgage of trust property. The Oklahoma attorney general
has rendered an opinion stating that "it is clear that the Legislature
recognized notes as one type of authorized obligation which a public
trust could issue."8 In rendering the opinion, the attorney general re-
lied on language in the Public Trust Act providing that "[e]xpress trusts
may be created to issue obligations and to provide funds for the further-
ance and accomplishment of any authorized and proper public func-
tion or purpose of the state or of any county or municipality..."I"
The attorney general also relied on other language of the Public Trust
Act referring to the issuing of "bonds, notes, or other evidences of in-
debtedness. ' '8 2 This opinion appears to be correct, and the same conclu-
sion would be justified as to bonds and other evidences of indebtedness.
If a county or municipality is a beneficiary of the trust, then the Public
Trust Act requires approval of any indebtedness or obligation by a
two-thirds vote of the beneficiary prior to creation of the indebtedness
or obligation.83 The question of whether a public trust may pledge or
mortgage trust property as security for an indebtedness was answered
affirmatively by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1955.84 The court
78. 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 214 (Okla. 1981).
79. Id at 215.
80. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 571, 572 (Okla. 1978).
81. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 571, 572 (Okla. 1978) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(a) (Supp.
1977)) (emphasis added).
82. Id (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178.2 (Supp. 1977).
83. Id § 176(d).
84. Board of County Comm'rs v. Warram, 285 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1955).
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relied on a provision in the Oklahoma Trust Act permitting a trustee to
secure a debt with trust property if authorized by the trust instrument.85
In summary, if it is desired that the trustees have the power to
borrow and to secure the debt with trust property, the trust instrument
must authorize the trustee to do so. 6 If the beneficiary of the trust is a
county or municipality, authorization by the governing board of the
beneficiary will also be necessary to create an indebtedness or
obligation.
B. Revenue Bonds
The Oklahoma Constitution places debt limitations on both the
state and its political subdivisions.87 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has made it clear that these constitutional debt limits are not violated
by the issuance of revenue bonds by a public trust with the state or a
political subdivision as beneficiary if the state or political subdivision is
not obligated on the bonds.8
Both the Public Trust Act 9 and the Local Industrial Development
Act90 authorize the issuance of revenue bonds by public trusts. The
requirements of the two laws differ. These requirements will not be
discussed in detail in this article. If a public trust contemplates the
issuance of revenue bonds, the provisions of both Acts should be ex-
amined and compared.91
One important difference between the provisions of the two Acts
should be noted. Under the Public Trust Act no indebtedness or obli-
gation can be created by a public trust, the beneficiary of which is a
county or municipality, "until such indebtedness or obligation has been
85. 285 P.2d at 1041 (relying on OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.24 (1951)). See also 10 Op. Att'y
Gen. 571 (Okla. 1978) (notes of public trust may be secured by personal property of trust, relying
on Warram).
86. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 571 (Okla. 1978) ("[a] question concerning the powers of the trustees of
a public trust always involves a question as to whether trustees were granted such powers in its
trust instrument.").
87. See OKLA. CONsT. art. X, §§ 23, 25, 26, 27.
88. Morris v. Oklahoma City, 299 P.2d 131 (Okla. 1956); Board of County Comm'rs v. War-
ram, 285 P.2d 1034 (Okla. 1955).
89. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 176-180.4 (1981).
90. Id tit. 62, §§ 651-664.
91. The issuance of revenue bonds by a public trust also has implications under both the
Oklahoma Uniform Securities Act and the Federal Securities Act of 1933. A detailed discussion
of securities law issues is beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that any
offer or sale of securities, such as revenue bonds by a public trust, should only be made after
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approved by a two-thirds (M) vote of the governing body of the benefi-
ciary." 92 Voter approval, however, is not necessary. The Local Indus-
trial Development Act "allows any municipality and any county to use
a trust created under the Public Trust Act for the purposes of securing
or developing industry."93 A major difference in the procedure for is-
suing revenue bonds under the Local Industrial Development Act is
that, unlike the Public Trust Act, it requires "the approval of a majority
of the qualified electors of the municipality or county voting at an elec-
tion called for that purpose." 94 The election requirement of the Local
Industrial Development Act makes the Public Trust Act provisions on
issuance of revenue bonds comparatively less onerous. An important
question, then, is when does each Act apply.
One could argue that the provisions of the Local Industrial Devel-
opment Act apply to all industrial revenue bonds issued by a public
trust with a municipality or county as a beneficiary. This essentially
was the position of the plaintiff in a case decided by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in 1963.95 The plaintiff contended that the Local In-
dustrial Development Act supersedes the Public Trust Act to the extent
that the financing of improvements and facilities for attracting and de-
veloping industry is concerned.96 The court rejected the plaintiffs ar-
gument holding that: "At no point in the Local Industrial
Development Act is it specifically stated that such act supersedes any
other act. In fact, the language of. . . that act indicates otherwise."9 7
The court continued: "We have held previously under the Public Trust
Act. . . that approval of the electors is not required for the issuance of
revenue bonds."98 In conclusion, the court noted:
[The] Local Industrial Development Act allows any munici-
pality and any county to use a trust created under such Public
Trust Act for the purpose of securing or developing industry.
In the event a municipality or county desires that a trust cre-
ated or used by it shall raise funds by the issuance and sale by
the trust of its revenue bonds, then in such event the electors
of the municipality or county must approve the issuance of
such bonds. The trust formed in the instant case is not one
92. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(d) (1981).
93. Fort v. Oklahoma Indus., Inc., 385 P.2d 470, 475 (Okla. 1963).
94. OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 654 (1981).
95. Fort, 385 P.2d 470.
96. Id at 472.
97. Id at 473.
98. Id at 474.
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created by Oklahoma City [the beneficiary] or presently being
used by it for any purposes of such City as provided in the
Local Industrial Act . . .and, therefore, is not governed by
the provisions of such Local Industrial Development Act
In the instant case it was not the municipality or county
which created the trust, but rather a private corporation, nor
is Oklahoma City presently using the trust for industry-get-
ting purposes. The Local Industrial Development Act applies
only to trusts created by municipalities or counties.99
The court thus relied heavily on the fact that Oklahoma City was
not the creator of the public trust of which it was the named benefici-
ary. It also spoke of the fact that the trust was not "used" by
Oklahoma City for industrial development purposes. From the lan-
guage of the opinion, it appears that this observation was not meant to
imply that the trust was inactive, or that it was not being employed for
business-attracting purposes, but rather, that the trust was being "used"
by some party other than Oklahoma City. It is speculative whether this
conclusion was drawn from the fact that Oklahoma City was not the
creator of the trust or whether it was based upon observations by the
court regarding the identity of the trustees or upon still other factors.
In a subsequent case also decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
the question of the applicability of the election requirement of the Lo-
cal Industrial Development Act was raised again.l°0 This case involved
a public trust created by the Ardmore Industrial Corporation in which
the city of Ardmore, Oklahoma was the beneficiary. The mayor of
Ardmore was one of five voting trustees and the city manager was one
of two non-voting trustees. The purposes of the trust clearly included
industrial development and the trustees admitted that they intended to
issue the $73,000,000 aggregate principal amount of industrial develop-
ment bonds provided for in the bond indenture without an election.101
The supreme court quickly disposed of the plaintiff's argument that an
election was required, stating: "We conclude that. ..the Local Indus-
trial Development Act . . . has no application to the situation
presented by the pleadings in this case."' 02 The court did not specify
why the Local Industrial Development Act was inapplicable. How-
99. Id at 475.
100. Morrison v. Ardmore Indus. Dev. Corp., 444 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1968).
101. Id at 818-19.
102. Id at 821.
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ever, its conclusion does appear to be based, at least in part, on the fact
that the city of Ardmore did not create the trust.
In sum, the identity of the creator of a public trust appears to be a
significant factor in determining whether the election requirement of
the Local Industrial Development Act applies. Therefore, the issuance
of industrial development bonds by a public trust created by a munici-
pality or county will certainly require an election. The issuance of such
bonds by a public trust created by some other party might not. How-
ever, an attempt by a municipality or county to avoid compliance with
the Local Industrial Development Act by simply requesting that an-
other party-for example a private citizen or a nonprofit corporation-
create a public trust with the city or county as the beneficiary for the
purpose of issuing industrial revenue bonds would probably be unsuc-
cessful. The acts of such other party would likely be imputed to the
municipality or county. Finally, it seems clear that the election re-
quirement, in any event, only applies to bonds issued for the purpose of
industrial development and not to bonds issued for other purposes.
C. Receipt of Government Funds
There would seem to be no prohibition against a public trust re-
ceiving funds from the federal government if such receipt is authorized
by the instruments or articles creating the trust. In addition, the
Oklahoma statutes provide:
The municipal governing body may receive funds for
and participate in any federal program, and may cooperate
with the United States Government and any agency or instru-
mentality thereof, in the manner authorized and provided by
federal law and regulation. In doing so, a municipality may
perform all necessary functions and take all necessary actions
for accomplishing such federal purposes and programs, as
agent of the federal government, notwithstanding any provi-
sions of state law.10 3
Since the Public Trust Act permits the formation of a trust for "the
furtherance and accomplishment of any authorized and proper public
function or purpose" of the beneficiary," it would seem that a public
trust with a municipality as a beneficiary could be authorized to act as
an agent of the federal government for purposes of federal programs.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 22-126 (1981).
104. Id tit. 60, § 176(a) (1981).
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There would also appear to be no problem with the state providing,
and a public trust accepting, state funds if the trust is authorized to do
so. This conclusion is supported by the language of the Public Trust
Act which provides that "[t]he trustee, or trustees . . . shall be an
agency of the state. .. .o
The Public Trust Act does provide that "no funds of said benefici-
ary derived from sources other than the trust property, or the operation
thereof, shall be charged with or expended for the execution of said
trust, except by express action of the legislative authority of the benefi-
ciary prior to the charging or expending of the funds." 10 6 This would
require the Oklahoma legislature to specifically approve the spending
of state funds by a public trust which has the state as a beneficiary.
Presumably this provision does not require express action by the
Oklahoma legislature prior to the spending of state funds by a public
trust which has a county or municipality as its beneficiary. It is likely,
however, that the state's budget procedures would bring to the legisla-
ture's attention any state monies headed for such trusts.
Finally, there would seem to be nothing preventing a municipality
or a county from providing funds to a public trust of which it is a bene-
ficiary to be expended for a valid purpose of the municipality or
county. Indeed, the Public Trust Act seems to recognize this in provid-
ing, as mentioned above, that the funds of the beneficiary derived from
sources other than trust property, or the operation thereof, shall not be
expended without express action by the legislative authority of the ben-
eficiary.1"7 The conclusion that a municipality or county can appropri-
ate money to a public trust of which it is the beneficiary is supported by
105. Id § 179.
106. Id § 176(a).
107. Id The requirement that no funds of the beneficiary other than those derived from trust
property or the operation of trust property can be expended without the approval of the governing
body of the beneficiary is buttressed by other statutory provisions. First, the Oklahoma statutes
dealing with municipal corporations provide:
Any act of a municipal governing body which provides . . . for appropriating
money shall not be valid unless a majority of all the councilmembers or trustees vote in
favor of the action. The municipal governing body may not appropriate or draw any
order on the treasurer for money unless the same has been appropriated in the manner
provided by law or ordered in pursuance of some object provided by law.
Id tit. 11, § 17-101. Second, the Oklahoma statutes dealing with counties provide:
It shall be [the county treasurer's] duty to receive all monies belonging to the county
from whatever source they may be derived, and other monies which by law are directed
to be paid to him, and all monies received by him for the use of the county shall be paid
by him only on the warrants of the board of county commissioners, drawn according to
law, and all other monies shall be paid over by him as provided by law.
Id tit. 19, § 623.
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other language of the Public Trust Act. It provides that "[t]he trustee,
or trustees. . . shall be. . . the regularly constituted authority of the
beneficiary for the performance of the functions for which the trust
shall have been created."' 08
V. OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
BY PUBLIC TRUSTS
A. Constitutional and Statutory Considerations
The provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution dealing with munic-
ipal corporations prohibit the surrendering of the power to fix charges
for public services.' 0 9 These provisions require approval of a majority
of the qualified electors of a municipal corporation before a franchise
can be granted, extended or renewed, and limit such grants, renewals
and extensions to a maximum of twenty-five years."0 In addition, the
granting of exclusive franchises is prohibited."'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has decided a case involving the
application of the above constitutional provisions to a public trust
formed to construct, maintain and operate a gas utility."' The public
trust had several towns and cities as beneficiaries. These beneficiaries
had surrendered the right to control or direct the trustees or the trust.
The court stated that a public trust is a separate legal entity from the
beneficiary thereof. 113 As a result, the court determined that the power
to regulate rates had been surrendered, an exclusive franchise had been
granted, a franchise in excess of twenty-five years had been granted,
and voter approval of the granting of a franchise had not been ob-
tained," 4 all in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.
In a subsequent case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court dealt with a
lease of a city-owned utility to a public trust. 15 The court stated, "We
do not believe that a lessee of a city-owned utility is required to obtain
a franchise in order to operate the city-owned public utility within the
108. Id tit. 60, § 179 (1981). Cf Arthur v. City of Stillwater, 611 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1980) (sug-
gesting city sales tax revenues may be paid to public trust for proper municipal purpose, but
holding direct payment of revenues to public trust, without deposit in general fund and appropria-
tion by city commissioners, violates Oklahoma statutes).
109. OKLA. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 7.
110. id § 5(a).
111. Id §7.
112. State v. Garrison, 348 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1959).
113. 348 P.2d at 863.
114. Id at 864-65.
115. Meder v. Oklahoma City, 350 P.2d 916 (Okla. 1960).
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corporate limits of said city.""n 6 The court noted that: "It is not con-
tended that the City would be required to obtain a franchise to operate
its own utility.""I7 According to the court, the duty to operate the pub-
lic utility had been delegated to the trust." 8 The court held, however,
that a lease provision that the city would not acquire or permit to be
acquired or, operated any competing facilities violated a provision of
the Oklahoma Constitution which, in essence, gives the electors of the
municipality the right to demand a vote on such a question.1 9 The
court also decided that the power to regulate charges for a public serv-
ice had not been surrendered. "Our attention is not invited to any con-
stitutional or statutory provisions which prevents [sic] a city from fixing
the rates and charges for services performed by a city-owned utility."' 20
If a municipality contemplates the sale or lease of a municipally
owned utility to a public trust, the Oklahoma statutes may require an
election on the question. The Oklahoma statutes provide:
No public utility owned by any municipality. . . shall be
sold, conveyed, leased or otherwise disposed of by the munici-
pal governing body unless such sale, lease, conveyance, or
other disposal of such utility shall be authorized by the vote of
a majority of the registered voters of the municipality voting
on the question at an election to be held for such purpose.' 2 '
In addition, the sale or lease must be to the highest and best bidder, if
satisfactory to the governing body. 22 An exception to the election re-
quirement is provided: "Any municipality governed by charter, when
authorized by such charter, may sell, convey or lease any public utility
owned by the municipality without conducting an election ....
Whether the authority to sell, convey or lease a municipally owned
utility is granted by election or by charter, the constitutional require-
ment for a vote on the question of granting a franchise if one is neces-
sary is still applicable.
116. Id at 921.
117. Id (emphasis in original).
118. 350 P.2d at 922.
119. Id at 923 (relying on OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 5(b)).
120. 350 P.2d at 923 (emphasis in original).
121. OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 35-202 (1981). The election requirement is applicable to munici-
pally owned utilities with a cash value in excess of $10,000. Id § 35-201.
122. Id § 35-203(3).
123. Id § 35-201.
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B. Jurisdiction of Corporation Commission
The Oklahoma statutes define a "public utility" for purposes of
Corporation Commission jurisdiction as follows:
The term "public utility". . . shall be taken to mean and
include every corporation, association, company, individuals,
their trustees, lessees, or receivers, successors or assigns, ex-
cept as hereinafter provided, and except cities, towns, or other
bodies politic, that now or hereafter may own, operate, or
manage any plant or equipment, or any part thereof, directly
or indirectly, for public use, or may supply any commodity to
be furnished to the public.
(a) For the conveyance of gas by pipeline.
(b) For the production, transmission, delivery or fur-
nishing of heat or light with gas.
(c) For the production, transmission, delivery or fur-
nishing electric current for light, heat or power.
(d) For the transportation, delivery or furnishing of
water for domestic purposes or for power."2 4
The Corporation Commission's authority to supervise public utili-
ties is very broad.12 5 However, the supervisory powers of the Corpora-
tion Commission do have their limits. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has stated:
Although the Corporation Commission has general su-
pervision over all public utilities, the Constitution does not
clothe it with the general power of internal management and
control incident to ownership. The Commission has the
power to supervise and regulate the public duties and obliga-
tions of such utilities but is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the utilities concerning their internal
124. Id tit. 17, § 151 (1981).
125. The Oklahoma statutes provide:
The Commission shall have general supervision over all public utilities, with power
to fix and establish rates and to prescribe rules, requirements and regulations, affecting
their services, operation, and the management and conduct of their business; shall in-
quire into the management of the business thereof, and the method in which same is
conducted. It shall have full visitorial and inquisitorial power to examine such public
utilities, and keep informed as to their general conditions, their capitalization, rates,
plants, equipments, apparatus, and other property owned, leased, controlled or operated,
the value of same, the management, conduct, operation, practices and services; not only
with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service, but
also with respect to their compliance with the provisions of this act, and with the Consti-
tution and laws of this state, and with the orders of the Commission.
Id tit. 17, § 152.
19831
22




In 1970 the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the question of
whether a public trust was subject to the statutory provision giving the
Corporation Commission jurisdiction over all "public utilities."1 27 The
court noted that "[t]he trustees of a trust created for furtherance of pub-
lic functions are 'an agency of the State and the regularly constituted
authority of the beneficiary (county or municipality) for the perform-
ance of the functions for which the trust shall have been created.' ",28
According to the court, the Corporation Commission's contention that
it had jurisdiction rested on the assumption that, "[t]he Legislature cre-
ated 'an agency of the state' (the trustees) and gave that agent the au-
thority to perform the functions for which the trust was created and at
the same time left the newly created agency under the control of an-
other state agency, the Corporation Commission.' 29 The court, how-
ever, did not agree with the commission's argument as to the
Legislature's intent and decided that since the Public Trust Act was
"silent as to what tribunal may hear complaints regarding the adminis-
tration of these [public] trusts, it must be assumed the Legislature in-
tended that the district courts would exercise judicial supervision over
these trusts, as in other trusts."1
30
Subsequent to this decision, the Oklahoma statutes were amended
to expressly bring some public trusts within the jurisdiction of the Cor-
poration Commission. The relevant provision now reads, in part, as
follows:
A. The Corporation Commission shall have rate-making
authority and general jurisdiction over all supply systems of
natural gas, steam heat and steam serving the general public
notwithstanding operation thereof by a trust, authority, coop-
erative and subsidiary created for the benefit or furtherance of
a public function pursuant to a trust or public trust, unless the
said body operating said system has financing or is in the pro-
cess of financing the acquisition, improvement or extension of
the said system with a loan from the United States of America
and is a nonprofit trust.
B. The Corporation Commission shall also have general su-
126. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 543 P.2d 546, 551 (Okla. 1975)
(emphasis added).
127. Oklahoma County Util. Servs. Auth. v. Corporation Comm'n, 478 P.2d 352 (Okla. 1970).
128. Id at 353 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 179 (1961)).
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pervision over any person or entity to whom the function of
operating a natural gas, steam heat or steam supply system
has been delegated by such a trust, authority, cooperative or
subsidiary. Provided nothing herein shall be construed to ap-
ply to a public trust whose board of trustees is composed of
elected officials or is elected by the customers or a majority of
which is composed of members selected by the governing
bodies of municipalities in which the public trust operates, or
members which it serves, and which board of trustees has the
authority to establish and regulate its own rates. 3'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that this provision was
constitutional and held that the Oklahoma legislature could confer ju-
risdiction upon the Corporation Commission to fix the rates of a public
trust that distributes natural gas.
132
In addition, the Public Trust Act was amended in an attempt to
include some public trusts within the Corporation Commission's juris-
diction. The pertinent provision reads, in part, as follows:
A. The Corporation Commission shall have general super-
vision over trusts created for the benefit and furtherance of a
public function pursuant to Title 60 of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes, Sections 176 et seq., where:
1. The trust has multiple beneficiaries; and
2. A water supply system is operated by the trust or a
person or entity to which such function has been del-
egated; and
3. The water supply system is operated in a county hav-
ing a population in excess of five hundred thousand
(500,000) persons according to the most recent Fed-
eral Decennial Census; and
4. The beneficiaries do not regulate the rates, charges
and practices of the water supply system.
B. The Corporation Commission shall also have general su-
pervision over any person or entity to whom the function of
operating a water supply system has been delegated by such a
trust. 
33
This particular provision was held to be unconstitutional by the
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 160.1(A), (B) (1981).
132. See Southeastern Okla. Dev. & Gas Auth. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 606 P.2d 574
(Okla. 1980).
133. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 180.4 (1981).
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Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1974.'1" The court took judicial notice of
the fact that at that time only Oklahoma County met the population
requirement. 35 The court held that the population requirement was
not a proper and legitimate classification since it bore no reasonable
relationship to the object to be accomplished by the provision. Thus,
the court held that the provision was an unconstitutional special law
and conferred no jurisdiction on the Corporation Commission.'36
In sum, the current jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission is
limited to some public trusts supplying natural gas, steam heat or steam
to the general public. It is clear, however, that the Oklahoma legisla-
ture has the constitutional authority to increase the jurisdiction of the
Corporation Commission over public trusts.
VI. ENGAGING IN BUSINESS FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE
A. In General
The Oklahoma Public Trust Act permits the creation of trusts "for
the furtherance and accomplishment of any authorized and proper
public function or purpose of the state or of any county or municipality
. . . with the state, or any county or municipality as the beneficiary
thereof."137 Thus, a determination of the proper purposes of a public
trust requires a determination of the appropriate functions or purposes
of its beneficiary.
The Oklahoma Constitution provides that "[tihe right of the State
to engage in any occupation or business for public purposes shall not
be denied nor prohibited, except that the State shall not engage in agri-
culture for any other than educational and scientific purposes and for
support of its penal, charitable, and educational institutions."', 3 If the
state is the beneficiary of a public trust, it is clear that the trust can
engage in any business for a public purpose except agriculture. In 1970
the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered an opinion involving the ques-
tion of whether a public trust with the state of Oklahoma as beneficiary
134. See Oklahoma County Util. Services Auth. v. Corporation Comm'n, 519 P.2d 919 (Okla.
1974).
135. Id at 921.
136. Id at 922. The specific constitutional provision found to be violated was OKLA. CO NST.
art. V, § 59.
137. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 176(a) (1981).
138. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 31. Cf. Shipp v. Southeastern Okla. Indus. Auth., 498 P.2d 1395,
1399 (Okla. 1972) (Oklahoma is a sovereign state possessing all power and authority of a sover-
eign except as limited by Oklahoma and United States Constitutions).
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could build and operate a parking facility for a public purpose. 39 In
holding that it could, the court stated:
Our Constitution, Art. 2 § 31, states that, "The right of
the state to engage in any occupation or business forpublic
purposes shall not be denied nor prohibited," (emphasis sup-
plied) except in certain situations not applicable here.
However, the present situation is not one where the State
itself will actually engage in the business of constructing and
operating the parking facility. This will be done by the Trust.
Under the provisions of [the Public Trust Act], the Trust
"shall be an agency of the State and the regularly constituted
authority of the beneficiary for the performance of the func-
tions for which the trust shall have been created." 1
40
If a county or municipality is the beneficiary of a public trust, it is
not clear whether the trust can engage in business for a public purpose.
As to municipalities, the Oklahoma Constitution provides that "[elvery
municipal corporation within this State shall have the right to engage
in any business or enterprise which may be engaged in by a person,
firm, or corporation by virtue of a franchise from said corporation."
't4 1
One possible reading of the phrase "which may be engaged in. . . by
virtue of a franchise from said corporation" is that municipalities may
engage in only those businesses which, if done by a private interest,
would require a franchise. It is unclear which enterprises this reading
would permit, although it is clear that enterprises traditionally consid-
ered to be public utilities would be permissible. 1
42
It could be argued that in some cases a broader authority to en-
gage in business for a public purpose could be given to home rule cities.
The Bill of Rights of the Oklahoma Constitution provides for the "right
of the State to engage in any occupation or business for public pur-
poses." 43 Professor Merrill has written that the legislature has author-
ity under this provision to vest that right in municipalities as agencies
of the state.' He suggests that the charter of a home rule city is
equivalent to a grant from the legislature: "[I]t seems clear that such a
139. See Application of Southern Okla. Dev. Trust, 470 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1970).
140. 470 P.2d at 574 (emphasis in original). The court also stated that "there can be no doubt
that the parking facility is for 'public purposes.'" Id
141. OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, § 6.
142. See Merrill, The ConstitutionalRights of Oklahoma Cities, 21 OKLA. L. REv. 251, 265-66
(1968).
143. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
144. See Merrill, supra note 142, at 269.
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charter could give authority to the city. . . to engage in any business
or occupation, as fully as the legislature might do."' 45 He notes that
there is an absence of case law supporting this interpretation but points
out that the efficacy of comprehensive city charters which contain
clauses conferring upon the cities full discretion as to public enterprise
has been recognized "over and over again" by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. 146 If Professor Merrill's view were adopted by the Oklahoma
courts, a home rule city could engage in any type of enterprise for a
public purpose as long as the charter authorized such activity. It fol-
lows that a public trust with that city as beneficiary could be authorized
by the trust instrument to do so also.
The Oklahoma Constitution has no provision dealing with the
ability of counties to engage in business. A county is a political subdi-
vision of the state and is generally held to have only those powers as-
signed to it by the state legislature. 14  The Oklahoma statutes do not
appear to contain a general authorization for counties to engage in any
and every type of business. Thus, a public trust with a county as the
beneficiary could not be provided with a general authorization to en-
gage in business, even business with a public purpose.
Finally, it should be noted that both the Public Trust Act and the
Local Industrial Development Act expressly restrict a public trust's
purposes and activities. A public trust shall not have any trust purpose,
function or activity (1) in any wholesale outlet, unless located on the
same premises with and a direct part of an industry; (2) in any retail
outlet, unless operated in conjunction with and on the same premises as
an industrial, manufacturing, cultural, recreational, parking, transpor-
tation or airport facility; or (3) in residential enterprises, subject to lim-
ited exceptions. 148 The Oklahoma attorney general has rendered an
opinion that the phrase "retail outlet" as used in the restriction on pub-
lic trust purposes and activities includes motels and restaurants. 149
145. Id
146. Id at 269-70.
147. See Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 468 P.2d 501 (Okla.
1970).
148. The Public Trust Act restriction on public trust purposes is OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178.4
(1981). The Local Industrial Development Act restriction is Id tit. 62, § 652. The exceptions to
the restriction against residential purposes and activities are found at Id tit. 60, § 178.6.
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B. Securing or Developing Industry
The Oklahoma legislature has expressly authorized municipalities
and counties to engage in certain businesses. The Local Industrial De-
velopment Act provides, in part:
Any municipality and any county is hereby authorized to
own, acquire, construct, reconstruct, extend, equip, improve,
maintain, sell, lease, contract concerning, or otherwise deal in
or dispose of any lands, buildings, or facilities of any and
every nature whatever that can be used in securing or devel-
oping industry within or near the municipality or county.'50
In addition, the Act states that municipalities and counties are author-
ized "to use any available revenues for the accomplishment of the
[above] purposes." ''
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that a public trust with a
municipality as beneficiary which had been formed pursuant to the Lo-
cal Industrial Development Act could engage in the business of acquir-
ing land, constructing an industrial building, and leasing the building
to a manufacturing company.' 52 According to the court, under the
Oklahoma Constitution the state cannot be prohibited from engaging
in any business for a public purpose except agriculture. 15 3 The court
held the public trust was a public corporation which had been dele-
gated a state function. Therefore, it could engage in the authorized
business for a public purpose.' 54
This decision did not answer the question of whether a public trust
with a municipality or county as beneficiary can engage in the activities
authorized by the Local Industrial Development Act if the public trust
is not formed pursuant to the Local Industrial Development Act. The
answer would seem to be yes. As discussed above, a public trust can be
formed under the Public Trust Act for the furtherance and accomplish-
ment of any authorized and proper function of its beneficiary. The Lo-
cal Industrial Development Act has authorized cities to engage in
certain activities for the purpose of securing or developing industry.
Thus, it would seem that a public trust could be formed under the Pub-
lic Trust Act to engage in such activities. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court appears to have adopted this position, although perhaps on dif-
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 62, § 652 (1981).
151. Id § 653.
152. See Harrison v. Claybrook, 372 P.2d 602 (Okla. 1962).
153. 372 P.2d at 605 (referring to OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 31).
154. 372 P.2d at 605.
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ferent grounds. In a case involving a public trust formed under the
Public Trust Act with development of industry as one of its purposes,
the court stated:
An amendment to our State Constitution, Article 10,
§ 35, became effective May 1, 1962. That amendment author-
ized cities and towns to finance the acquisition and develop-
ment of industry and industrial improvements and facilities
through the means of the voting and issuance of revenue
bonds. Since the adoption of such amendment and pursuant
to the Public Trust Act . . . the developing and securing of
industry is an authorized and proper function of the trustees
of a public trust of which a municipality is the beneficiary.1 5
C. Taxation of Public Trust Property Leased to Private Industry
The Oklahoma Constitution states that "all property . . . of this
State, and of counties and of municipalities of this State. . .shall be
exempt from taxation ..... 156 In addition, the Oklahoma statutes
provide that all property of the state and of the counties, school dis-
tricts, and municipalities of the state are exempt from taxation.'
5 7
These provisions would exempt from taxation the property of a public
trust.' 58
A problem arises, however, when real property owned by a public
trust is leased to a private business enterprise. The Oklahoma Public
Trust Act provides that:
public trusts . . . issuing revenue bonds, notes or other evi-
dences of indebtedness for industrial development purposes
shall require the lessee of each industrial project owned by the
public trust. . . to pay an annual sum in lieu of ad valorem
taxes for each year following the tenth anniversary date of the
issuance of such revenue bonds, notes or other evidences of
indebtedness. I 9
This section seems to be based on a legislative assumption that such
real property is exempt from ad valorem taxes. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, however, ruled in 1980 that property titled to a public
155. Fort v. Oklahoma Indus., Inc., 385 P.2d 470, 472 (Okla. 1963).
156. OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
157. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2405(b) (1981).
158. See General Motors Corp. v. Oklahoma County Bd. of Equalization, - P.2d _ 54
OKLA. B.J. 1351, 1352 (Okla. May 17, 1983) ("[T]he property belonging to a public trust is exempt
from taxation-Art. 10, § 6, Okla. Const.") (dicta).
159. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 178.7 (1981).
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trust which was leased to a private concern would be subject to ad
valorem tax if the private concern was the "owner" of such property.
1 60
According to the court, if the quantum of interest of the private parties
in the property is sufficient to constitute "ownership," then the private
parties are responsible for payment of ad valorem taxes on that inter-
est.' 61 The court found that a lease agreement which required the pri-
vate party to purchase, and the trust to sell property for one hundred
dollars ($100) at the termination of the lease was tantamount to an ex-
ecutory contract of sale.
162
The Oklahoma attorney general rendered an opinion in 1979 that
any leasehold interest of a private party in public trust property is sub-
ject to ad valorem taxation. 163 The Oklahoma Supreme Court decision
discussed above is narrower than the position of the attorney general.
The court, in its opinion, expressly declined to approve or disapprove
the attorney general opinion. 64
In 1983 the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided a case involving
the validity of a purported tax abatement agreement between the state
of Oklahoma and the lessee of an industrial facility financed by a pub-
lic trust holding record title.' 65 The lessee, who was to purchase the
facility for one thousand dollars after the bonds issued by the public
trust to finance the project were retired, admitted that the facility would
be subject to ad valorem taxation but for the alleged agreement.166 The
court held that any tax abatement agreement would be unconstitutional
and thus without effect.' 67 In addition, the court rejected the argument
that the state should be estopped from assessing ad valorem taxes on
the lessee's property. 6 8
VII. PUBLIC TRUSTS AND THE INTERLOCAL COOPERATION ACT
In Oklahoma, a public trust can cooperate with other public agen-
cies or it can be a vehicle of cooperation by public agencies. The
160. State ex rel Cartwright v. Dunbar, 618 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1980).
161. Id at 906.
162. Id at 906-07.
163. 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 237 (Okla. 1979).
164. 618 P.2d at 914. However, Justice Doolin, concurring specially, expressed his opinion
that the position of the attorney general was correct. Id at 914-15.
165. General Motors Corp. v. Oklahoma County Bd. of Equalization, - P.2d - 54 OKLA.
B.J. 1351 (Okla. May 17, 1983).
166. Id at . 54 OKLA. B.J. at 1352.
167. Id at __ 54 OKLA. B.J. at 1353.
168. Id at . 54 OKLA. B.J. at 1352.
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Oklahoma legislature has adopted the Interlocal Cooperation Act. 169
The purpose of the Act is to allow local governmental units "to make
the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate
with other localities on a basis of mutual advantage."' 7 ° The Act pro-
vides, in part:
Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or
capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be
exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of
this state, and jointly with any public agency of any other
state or of the United States to the extent that laws of such
other state or of the United States permit such joint exercise
or enjoyment . 171
The phrase "public agency of this state" is defined by the Act as any
political subdivision of the state or any agency of the state govern-
ment. t72 It seems clear that a public trust is a public agency within the
meaning of the Interlocal Cooperation Act. 173 Therefore, a public trust
may be a party to an agreement pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation
Act.
There are two methods of exercising the powers permitted by the
Interlocal Cooperation Act. The first is the formal agreement
method.' 74 This method requires (1) an agreement for joint or cooper-
ative action;175 (2) approval of such agreement "by ordinance, resolu-
tion or otherwise pursuant to [the] law of the governing bodies of the
participating public agencies"; 76 (3) submission of the agreement to
169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 1001-08 (1981).
170. Id § 1001.
171. Id § 1004(a).
172. Id § 1003(a). The phrase "public agency" of any other state is defined by the Act as any
political subdivision of another state. Id The ability to use this Act to cooperate with political
subdivisions of another state depends mostly upon whether the laws of the other state grant statu-
tory authorization for its political subdivisions to participate in interlocal ventures. This presents
no problem with respect to some states. Arkansas, for example, has adopted an Interlocal Cooper-
ation Act which is virtually identical to that of Oklahoma. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-901 to
-908 (1979). Texas, however, is narrower with respect to its interlocal cooperation law, which only
permits "any city in this state which borders on a state line and which is separated from a city in
the adjoining state only by the state line, to cooperate with such adjoining city in another state in
furnishing governmental services and facilities ...." TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 969e
(Vernon Supp. 1982). It authorizes interlocal cooperation in extremely limited circumstances.
173. The Oklahoma attorney general has rendered an opinion that a public trust is a "public
agency" within the meaning of the Interlocal Cooperation Act. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 400 (Okla. 1971).
Cf. Merrill, Our Unrealized Resource-Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 349, 354-
55 (1970) (discussing term "public agency").
174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 1004-07 (1981).
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the Oklahoma attorney general for a determination that it is in proper
form and lawful;' 77 and (4) filing with the county clerk and the Secre-
tary of State.17 8 If the agreement deals "in whole or in part with the
provision of services or facilities with regard to which an officer or
agency of the state government has constitutional or statutory powers
of control," '7 9 there is an additional requirement that such officer or
agency approve the agreement as to all matters within his or its juris-
diction.'8 The requirements as to the contents of the agreement are set
out in the Act. The agreement must specify, among other things, the
purpose or purposes of the agreement and the precise organization,
composition and nature of any separate legal or administrative entity
created by the agreement, "provided such entity may be legally cre-
ated."'' It is clear that the Act would permit the utilization of a public
trust as the vehicle of cooperation between parties to a formal
agreement.18 2
The second authorized method of interlocal cooperation entails
simple contracts for governmental services.' 83 Thus, one or more pub-
lic agencies may contract with one or more other agencies to provide
governmental services or undertakings which "any of the public agen-
cies entering into the contract is authorized by law to perform."' 84 The
required formalities are that the contract be authorized by the gov-
erning body of each party and that the contract "set forth fully the
purposes, powers, rights, objectives and responsibilities of the con-
tracting parties."' 85 In conclusion, under the Oklahoma Interlocal Co-
operation Act it is probably sufficient if any one of the contracting
parties has the power to perform the function or service which is the
subject matter of the contract. It is not necessary that all of the con-
tracting entities be so empowered.'
86
177. Id § 1004(f).
178. Id § 1005.
179. Id § 1006.
180. Id
181. Id § 1004(c).
182. Application of Southern Okla. Dev. Trust, 470 P.2d 572, 574 (Okla. 1970). Merrill, supra
note 173, at 367-68.
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 1008 (1981).
184. Id
185. Id
186. Merrill, supra note 173, at 357-360; Merrill, Interlocal Cooperation Acts: A BriefSurvey,
41 OKLA. B.J. 1399, 1400 (1970).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Because a public trust is a public agency, its operation involves
considerations, such as the open meeting requirement, that might not
apply to a nonprofit corporation or other private entity. In addition,
the permissible uses of a public trust are, to a large degree, circum-
scribed by the authorized purposes and functions of its beneficiary.
Nevertheless, if employed in the proper manner, the public trust can be
a useful vehicle for rendering services to the public or for developing
industry.
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